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Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) [Hugo, Huigh or Hugeianus de Groot] was atowering figure in philosophy, political theory, law and associatedfields during the seventeenth century and for hundreds of yearsafterwards. His work ranged over a wide array of topics, though he isbest known to philosophers today for his contributions to the naturallaw theories of normativity which emerged in the later medieval andearly modern periods. This article will attempt to explain his views onthe law of nature and related issues while simultaneously providingsome broader assessment of his place in the history of ideas.
1. Life and works
1.1 Life
Prison escapee, high-stakes politician, shipwreck survivor, Grotiuswas a remarkable man who led a remarkable life. Born on April 10, 1583in Delft, Holland—Easter Sunday, as his biographers invariablynote—his family was moderately prosperous, well-educated andambitious. From these nourishing if not particularly distinguishedorigins, Grotius soon proved himself exceptional. When he was eight,he began writing skilful elegies in Latin; by eleven, he was a studentin the Faculty of Letters at the University of Leiden. In 1598, at thetender age of fifteen, he accompanied the leading Dutch politician ofthe day, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, on an embassy to the royal court ofFrance. There King Henry IV, impressed by his extraordinarylearnedness, hailed him as “the miracle of Holland.” And three yearslater, when the United Provinces decided to reinforce their autonomyfrom Spain by retaining an official Latin historiographer to chronicletheir history, they chose Grotius over Dominicus Baudius, a fullprofessor of rhetoric at Leiden, for the position.
In the small world of Dutch high society, Grotius had clearly beenidentified as a young man going places. While in France, he had earned(or possibly just bought) a law degree from the University ofOrléans. After returning to The Hague, he established a lawpractice and within a short time, his clientele includedOldenbarnevelt, the Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.) and PrinceMaurice of Nassau. Apparently he impressed Maurice, for when theposition of Attorney General of Holland, Zeeland and West Frieslandbecame available in 1607, the Prince chose him over two other olderand more experienced candidates. Grotius didn't particularly enjoy thepractice of law—in letters he voiced complaints familiar totoday's lawyers, bemoaning the tedium of the work and obstreperousclients—so he closed his firm upon being made AttorneyGeneral. Perhaps capitalizing on his new position and the healthysalary it paid, he soon married the redoubtable Maria vanReigersbergen, with whom he would eventually have three daughters andfour sons.
After several years as Attorney General, Grotius was appointedPensionary (roughly equivalent to Governor of an American state) ofRotterdam in 1613. That same year, he was called to put theory intopractice when a dispute arose between the English and the Dutch overthe freedom of the seas. The details are interesting but complicated:in essence, on the basis of the claim that two Dutch vessels weretrespassing on seas owned by England near Greenland, a small Britishfleet seized the contents of the Dutch ships. Grotius led a delegationto England in protest of the English actions. While history may havefavoured Grotius—his view that the seas are open to all wouldeventually come to be international law—real politick madevictory impossible for him at the time. The English were more powerfulthan the Dutch, and they neither returned the cargo nor conceded thelegal point.
1613 may have carried some excitement but the end of the decade wasone of the true zeniths (or nadirs, depending on one's perspective) ofGrotius' life. A dispute between orthodox Calvinists and reformersover arcane theological matters which no longer seem important to usquickly assumed enormous political significance. Grotius,Oldenbarnevelt and other supporters of religious tolerance werealigned on the side with the reformers or “Remonstrants”; Maurice, theCalvinist establishment and other so-called “Contra-Remonstrants” wereon the other. On August 29, 1618, Maurice and his allies staged acoup, overthrowing the States General (of which Grotius was a memberby virtue of his position as Pensionary of Rotterdam) and imprisoninghim along with Oldenbarnevelt and Rombout Hoogerbeets, the Pensionaryof Leiden. Consolidating his grip on power, Maurice soon moved toeliminate the Remonstrants and their supporters in government; as partof this putsch, Oldenbarnevelt was executed and Grotius andHoogerbeets were sentenced to life imprisonment. It would be overlydramatic to say Grotius languished there: he was allowed to correspondwith outsiders; moreover, he had books and writing materials, andindeed he composed much important work during this time. But the coldand damp cell was far from pleasant and there was the looming dangerthat the authorities would revisit his case and impose an even harsherpunishment. So in March 1621, Grotius and his wife Maria decidedenough was enough. Placing himself in a large trunk that Maria hadshipped to him, Grotius escaped prison by having the trunk carried outon the pretence that it contained a number of books. He fled toAntwerp and thence to Paris, where his family eventually joinedhim.
Now began a more stable and productive period. The French authoritieswelcomed Grotius by awarding him an annual pension which, while notalways paid, at least gave the promise of security. He begancomposition of De iure belli ac pacis (On the law of war andpeace), which was published by a Parisian press in 1625. Itquickly made Grotius famous: for example, in a letter to Grotius,Vossius says that Descartes told him that he had recently met theDutchman (in reply, Grotius wrote that he didn't remember meetingDescartes, an indication of their relative stature at the time).Perhaps encouraged by the reception of his work, Grotius triedreturning to the Netherlands in 1631. Initially, he may have hadreason to be optimistic: after practicing law for a little while inAmsterdam, he was offered the Governor Generalship of the V.O.C. inAsia. Soon enough, however, the authorities moved against him, placinga large price on his head and forcing him in April 1632 to flee hishome country. Grotius would never set foot there again.
This time, he went to Hamburg, Germany. Nearby Sweden (one of thesuperpowers of the day) had numerous connections to the city, whichmade it quite natural for Swedish authorities to notice the presenceand availability for hire of such a luminary. Moving to take advantageof the situation, they made him their Ambassador to France in1634. Grotius began his diplomatic duties in Paris the following year.It is hard to gauge his success as ambassador: while he did help tonegotiate a treaty which led to the end of the Thirty Years' War, hecould also be outmanoeuvred in the diplomatic game—at onepoint, his bumbling forced the Swedish Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna tocome to Paris and sort things out. Still, such storiesnotwithstanding, it is true that he lasted ten years in one of thehighest and most demanding diplomatic postings of his day (Swedenbeing of the superpowers of mid-seventeenth century Europe).
During this time, Grotius returned to the theological issues which hadearlier caused him such grief. The project of Christian unity—harmonizing both the various Protestant factions and the Protestantswith the Catholics—became increasingly important to him. Bothintellectually and practically, it was a task which suited him and hisplace in life: intellectually, because Christian unity raised manyconceptual puzzles which challenged his mind; practically, because asambassador for one of the great European powers, he could use hisposition to press the cause. Hp utility for mac. Of course, the cause was doomed tofailure—certainly, it was well beyond Grotius' abilities. Yet,it did lead him to write some extremely interesting and influentialworks, many of which were collected in his Opera OmniaTheologica.
After Queen Christina ascended to the throne in 1644, shesystematically began to undermine her rival Oxenstierna and—aspart of this infighting—recalled Grotius from hisambassadorship. She didn't fire him; instead, she instructed him tocome to Stockholm and assume a different position. At first, Grotiusdidn't want to go, but bowing to the force of royal prerogative (notto mention economic necessity), he set sail for Stockholm in March1645. It was a fateful decision: travelling conditions on the Balticin late winters can be harsh; his ship wrecked and Grotius barelyescaped with his life. After spending a few months in Sweden, hedecided to return to Germany and so undertook another voyage. Again,conditions were poor; it took eight long days to cross the relativelynarrow stretch of water. This time, it was too much: weakened byrecent events, Grotius died on August 28, 1645, in Rostock,Germany. While they are probably apocryphal, his supposed last words—“By attempting many things, I have accomplished nothing”—do evoke the span of his life's work and his personalassessment of the results.
1.2 Works
Given that he led such an active public life while also raising alarge family, the sheer quantity of Grotius' works is nothing short ofastonishing. Typical, for him, was the time of his embassy to France.The same year as the embassy, he published Pontifex Romanus,a collection of six essays on recent political events. While workingon this, he produced what are in essence critical editions of twoworks: the Phaenomena, an astrononomical work of the3rd century BCE by Aratus of Soli, and Martianus Capella'shandbook of the seven liberal arts. He also began research on ahistory of the Netherlands, research would which much later wouldresult in the Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis. And hedid all this while still in his late teens. Over the full course ofhis life, Grotius would write or edit some five-dozen book-lengthworks and innumerable smaller pieces.
To philosophers and the philosophically-minded, two of these standout: De iure praedae commentarius (Commentary on the lawof prize and booty, henceforth referred to as “DIP”) andDe iure belli ac pacis (“DIB”). The former wasalmost lost. Placed in a trunk sometime during or after his life, thesole manuscript copy was uncovered when some of his descendents sold acollection of his papers in 1864 (for an account of these events, seeKnight (1925), Chap. 5). It was apparently commissioned by the V.O.C.around 1603. In it, Grotius was to defend the capture of a largePortuguese merchant ship by a V.O.C. fleet in the area aroundmodern-day Singapore. The key legal and conceptual question waswhether any private agent (such as the V.O.C.) could legitimatelyemploy force against another private agent which was impeding itsactions (see Tuck (1993), 170). But it also had an importantpropagandistic objective, which was to defame the Portuguese (andSpanish) while extolling the V.O.C. and Dutch (for more on the generalhistorical context of the DIP, see van Ittersum(2002)). Modern philosophical readers will find the “Prolegomena” ofChapter Two especially interesting, since that is where Grotius laysout his views on the nature and bases of rights. While Grotius chosenot to publish this or most of the manuscript, he did see ChapterTwelve into press. Given the title Mare Liberum (On thefreedom of the seas), it was both influential and controversial:among others, the Englishman John Selden published a criticalreply.
Whatever the merits of the DIP, it is on the DIBthat the bulk of Grotius' reputation rests. It consists of anintroduction and three books, totalling more than 900 pages intranslation. As with DIP, the introduction or “Prolegomena”holds the greatest interest for philosophers, for it is here thatGrotius articulates and defends the philosophical foundations of theDIB. While philosophers are naturally attracted to the“Prolegomena,” the body of the DIB is also redolent withthemes of philosophical interest. Book One defines the concept of war,argues for the legitimacy of war, and identifies who may legitimatelywage war. Book Two deals with the causes of war, the origins ofproperty, the transfer of rights and more, while Book Three isdedicated primarily to the rightful conduct of belligerents in war.After the initial publication in 1625, Grotius ushered several moreeditions to press during his life, each time adding more referenceswithout substantially changing the arguments. (A word of explanationabout citations to the DIB: they commonly take the form ofbook, chapter, section and—where applicable—paragraph;so, “I.1.10.1” means “Book One, Chapter One, Section Ten, ParagraphOne”.)
2. Method
The first reaction of many readers is to the very style of Grotius'prose. So before getting to his ideas and arguments, a few wordsshould be said his method, both in the DIP and theDIB (differences between the two—and there aredifferences—can be ignored for our purposes). There areseveral distinct sets of issues. First and most obviously, there isthe question of what we should make of the voluminous references toancient, medieval and early modern works which can be found in themargins of both books. Some have taken a rather dim view of them; in ascornful passage of Emile, Rousseau wrote:
True political theory [le droit politique] is yet to appear,and it is to be presumed that it never will. Grotius, the master ofall the savants in this subject, is but a child; and, what is worse, adishonest child [enfant de mauvaise foi]. When I hear Grotiuspraised to the skies and Hobbes covered with execration I see how farsensible men read or understand these two authors. The truth is thattheir principles are exactly the same: they only differ in theirexpression. They also differ in their method. Hobbes relies onsophisms, and Grotius on the poets; all the rest is the same.(Rousseau (1915), vol. II, 147)
It would be absurd to deny that Grotius does rely “on the poets”—after all, he said in the “Prolegomena” to the DIBthat “the testimony of philosophers, historians, poets, finally alsoof orators” will be used to “prove the existence of this law ofnature” (§40). Arguments from authority carried great weightfor him: the more illuminati one could cite, the better forone's argument. Philosophers today are not going to be impressed bysuch arguments, though they can be instructive to historians ofphilosophy. By studying Grotius' use of texts, one can learn how theywere interpreted in the early modern period—and this canunlock one of the many barriers to understanding that time.
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But is there more to his citations of these texts than just an overlyrespectful attitude toward authority? Most scholars think there is,though they are divided on what it might be. One possibility is thatthey reflect Grotius' commitment to the idea of philosophiaperennis. Like Leibniz a few decades later, Grotius thought therewere elements of truth in virtually all great thinkers. He writes, “Iquote them as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, proceeding frominnumerable different times and places, must be referred to someuniversal cause” (DIB, Prol. §40). His job as heir toideas of the great dead is to combine or synthesize them into a singleunified theory. And doing that requires him to draw on them asfrequently as possible.
Another suggestion sees Grotius as deeply concerned to refutescepticism about international law. Grotius was upset when thepowerful French Cardinal Richelieu told him, “the weakest are alwayswrong in matters of state.” How is it that he can convince doubterssuch as Richelieu of the existence and force of a set of normsgoverning the conduct of governments both domestically andinternationally? The argument will never be easily won but the burdenmay be lightened by sharing the load. If Grotius can show that so manypeople throughout history have accepted what the sceptic denies, thenperhaps the force of numbers may change the sceptic's mind.
Quite apart from the questions posed by the marginalia, an entirelydifferent aspect of Grotius' method concerns his refusal to divideethics, politics and law into separate subjects. These days,compartmentalization is the norm; ordinarily, we study one of thesesubjects while paying scant attention to the others. Now, it is truethat Grotius does often identify ways in which legal norms differ frommoral or political ones (see, e.g., the discussion of laws at thebeginning of DIB I.1). At the same time, he does not thinkthat law, politics and ethics are entirely distinct domains. If onereads Grotius with the expectation that he will keep them apart, onewill likely be befuddled by the way he ignores distinctions which areimportant to us. It may help to know that he does this because he isinterested in picking out the fundamental principles which lie at thebasis of all normativity, not just a portion thereof. Hecannot talk just about ethics, say, because his views on ethics areinformed by his views on politics and the law. A fundamental tenet ofhis thought is that moral, political and legal norms are all based onlaws derived from or supplied by nature.
The issues here are complex and much discussed. For more, see Dufour(1980), Tanaka (1993), Vermeulen (1983) and Whewell (1853).
3. Natural Law
Natural law is multiply ambiguous. It can be descriptive, in that itis sometimes supposed to describe a certain set of facts which obtainbecause of some natural features. At the same time, it can also beprescriptive, in that it is sometimes supposed to prescribe certainforms of behaviour as acceptable and proscribe others as unacceptable.On another level, its scope or range of application is unfixed. Somenatural law theories pertain to political entities (typically statesand relations among states); others, to civil laws; yet others, tomoral agents. On still another level, the ambiguities can be seen asstemming from the very notions of “natural” and “law.” “Natural” canrefer to human nature, or to the nature of the universe in general, orboth. One's sense of the validity and force of a natural law theorywill vary enormously depending on which reference is employed. “Law”was similarly contested. One extreme interpreted it literally, so thata natural law is a rule implemented by some agent (typically God)which compels obedience on pain of some penalty. The other extremetook “law” completely metaphorically, picking out some standard ornorm perceivable in natural phenomena which governs behaviour throughentirely impersonal means.
Such variation should not be surprising, for the natural law traditionwas long and robust. Though there were ties to the ancient world, itbegan in earnest with Aquinas, since he was the first to formulate agroup of ideas systematic enough to be called a theory. The traditioncontinued through the middle ages and into the early modern era before(allegedly) meeting its demise in Kant. Given that natural law wasthe dominant paradigm in ethics, politics and law forhundreds of years—much longer than the period from Kant to us—it is entirely predictable that theorists would have pushedthat paradigm in so many directions. It may be that there is someessence shared by all natural law theories; for example, one recentcommentator has suggested that the “stable core in [the natural lawtradition] is the idea that morals is primarily a matter of norms orprescriptions and only derivatively about virtues and values”(Haakonssen (1992), 884). But those who study natural law in theperiod of its flourishing will be impressed by the almost unlimitedpossibilities of interpretation.
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Datatables ajax pagination not working. Though this is not an article on the natural law, these points arenecessary preliminaries for considering Grotius' natural law views. IfGrotius is at all known to philosophers today, it is for being “thefather of natural law” (as put by, e.g., Vreeland (1917)). At this juncture, we need not assess the validity of this claim (for more on Grotius' originality, see Section 6 below). Instead, we ought to understand Grotius' actual views on the laws of nature. To understand his views, four issues need to be examined: first, the source of the laws; second, their nature or content; third, their force or obligatory status; finally, their scope.
Why are there natural laws? Do they exist in virtue of the nature ofthings or for some other reason? These are the questions lurkingbehind the issue of source. Grotius changed his mind on how theyshould be answered. In the DIP he declares that “What God hasshown to be His Will, that is law. This axiom points directly to thecause of law, and is rightly laid down as the primary principle”(Chap. II). Here Grotius announces a thesis about the relationbetween normativity and the divine being which is commonly known as“voluntarist”: by an act of volition, God determines the full andexact content of all normative categories—justice, goodnessand so forth. Voluntarism was a well-established tradition of naturallaw theories; the DIP belongs firmly in that tradition. Inlater works, however, Grotius departs from it. For example, in theDe summa potestatum, he declares that normativity of any kind“arises from the nature of the action itself, so that it is rightper se to worship God and it is right per se not tolie” (Opera Omnia Theologica, vol. III, p. 187). A much morefamous expression of non-voluntarism appears in the “Prolegomena” tothe DIB. In the first few sections of the “Prolegomena,”Grotius lays the groundwork for his natural law theory. Then, insection eleven, he writes that “What we have been saying would have adegree of validity even if we should concede [etiamsidaremus] that which cannot be conceded without the utmostwickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of noconcern to him.” Instead of emerging from or being otherwise dependenton God, the fundamental principles of ethics, politics and law obtainin virtue of nature. As he says, “the mother of right—that is,of natural law—is human nature” (Prol. §16). Somewhat later, he clarifies why it is that human nature produces the natural law: “The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points outthat an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rationalnature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; andthat, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined”(I.1.10.1). If an action agrees with the rational and social aspectsof human nature, it is permissible; if it doesn't, it is impermissible(cf. I.1.12.1). That is to say, the source of the natural law is the(in)compatibility of actions with our essences as rational and socialbeings. For discussion of the etiamsi daremus passage, see St. Leger (1962) and Todescan (2003).
Suppose we have established where the laws come from. This will revealnothing about the second of our four issues: viz., the content of thelaws or what they actually say. Grotius' views on how we should learnabout this were quite consistent: throughout his corpus, he continuedto maintain that (as he put it in the DIP), “The Will of Godis revealed, not only through oracles and portents, but above all inthe very design of the Creator; for it is from this last source thatthe law of nature is derived” (Chap. II). As he put it in theDIB, the law of nature “proceeds from the essential traitsimplanted in man” (Prol. §12). Where some other natural lawtheories solved the problem of knowledge through recourse to thesupernatural, Grotius did not. For him, a study of nature itself—and more specifically, a study of human nature—cansuffice to teach us the essentials of ethics, politics and law.
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And what, exactly, does such a study reveal about those fundamentalnormative principles? The reasoning in both the DIP andDIB may be reconstructed as follows. Human nature isconstituted by two essential properties: the desire forself-preservation and the need for society (see DIP, Chap. 2,and DIB, Prol. §§6–7). These two propertiestemper and inform each other: the desire for self-preservation islimited by the social impulse, so that humans do not naturally seek tomaintain and enhance their being at all costs; conversely, the needfor the company of other humans is limited by the self-preservationdrive, for individuals must naturally strive to secure the means fortheir well-being. Moreover, the self-preservation drive and thesociability impulse are both emotive and cognitive; they are bothnon-rational and rational, having the force of unreflective instinctas well as well-thought-out plans. Because we are essentially bothsocial and self-preserving beings, it follows that two things areimperative for our successful existence. We ought to abstain from whatbelongs to other persons, and we ought to engage in the reasonablepursuit of what genuinely serves our interest. Accordingly, Grotiusmakes these the first two elements of natural law in the DIB(see Prol. §§8, 10); they form the core of the firstfour “laws” in the DIP (see Chap. II). While these principlesenjoy lexical priority in the hierarchy of natural norms, they do notexhaust the list. A study of nature also teaches us that “Evil deedsmust be corrected” and “Good deeds must be recompensed” (Laws V-VI ofthe DIP). In fact, Grotius derives a list of some 22fundamental natural tenets in the DIP and a similarly largegroup (though not numbered in the same way) in the DIB. Anyexplanation of Grotius' natural law theory should begin by citingthese first-order tenets or principles, for they are what constituteits substance.
But why are they operative on us? Why do they enjoin or prohibit usfrom performing certain specific actions? Here we come to our thirdissue, concerning the laws' force or obligatory status. Traditionally,natural law theorists tended to invoke God for their solution to thisvery deep mystery. Aquinas, for example, argued that obligation is theresult of an action of will by a superior on an inferior (see, e.g.,Summa Theologica II.ii.q104). We are obliged to follow civillaws because our political superiors have forced us to do so throughactions of their more powerful wills. And we are obliged to follownatural laws because God has forced us to do so through his infinitelymore powerful will. Grotius was tempted by this view; he writes inDIB that morally necessary acts must be “understood asnecessarily commanded or forbidden by God” (I.1.10.2).
As any parent knows, however, “because I said so” is not themost compelling reason for action. That is true even when the person speaking is God. Hence thinkers have long sought to articulate other grounds forobligation. In Grotius' time, for example, Suarez wrote, “to break thenatural law without sinning involves an inconsistency… andtherefore the existence of an obligation which is imposed by thenatural law but which is not a matter of conscience also involves aninconsistency” (De legibus, II.IX.6). Here we find a verydifferent account of the basis of obligation: we are obliged toperform or avoid certain actions which are incompatible with ourconsciences, because we will be guilty of inconsistency if wedon't. To put it in slightly different terms, we are obliged toperform or avoid certain actions which are compatible or incompatiblewith our natures as rational beings, because we will be less thanhuman if we don't. Grotius adopts this idea for himself, modifying itin keeping with his rich conception of human nature: for him, naturallaw obliges us to perform actions which conduce to our rationality,sociability and need for self-preservation. This thought underliesseveral of his specific laws of nature—such as, for instance,the law that evil deeds must be corrected. Grotius places thisobligation under the heading of compensatory justice (DIP,Chap. Two). The “task of compensatory justice” is “restitution”: usingthe example of theft, Grotius explains that “such justice requiresthat the thing taken shall be returned” (ibid.). Evil deeds havedisturbed the moral and legal equilibrium of society; they haveunjustly benefited some while unjustly harming others. Since it isimperative to maintain healthy social relations, it is imperative thatevil deeds be punished.
The problem of explaining why we should obey the laws of nature—or indeed, why we should obey any set of norms—is oneof the most enduring in philosophy; it would be rash to suppose that asolution can be found in Grotius. One inadequacy of his account isinspired by Richelieu: while Grotius tries to separate and equalizeour rational, social and self-interested motives for action, one mayquestion whether they are in fact distinct and equal. If it can beshown that one is more fundamental than the others—that, say,self-interest is our first and most basic reason for action—then our reason for obeying the laws of nature and being moral will bevery different from what Grotius argued. (For additional discussion,see Korsgaard (1996), 7, 21–22 and 28–30.)
Moving on, we come to the last of our four issues—i.e.,scope. In Grotius' day, this issue was made urgent by Europeanencounters with indigenous peoples in the Americas and elsewhere (for discussion, see Tierney (1997), Chapter XI). Sometheorists tried to place epistemic or doxastic restrictions on thescope of the laws, arguing that they enjoined and protected only thosewho held certain beliefs. Since the beliefs which determined theapplicability of the laws were usually religious in nature, it wascommonly argued that natural laws were pertinent only to Christiansand did not cover non-Christians. Given that natural laws form thebasis for morality, then since they do not cover non-Christians, itfollows that Christians were under no obligations to treatnon-Christians morally. Like many others, Grotius strongly disagreedwith such arguments. For him, natural laws apply to all rational andsocial beings as such. It doesn't matter what they think or believe;if they are rational and social, they are bound by the law of nature(see, e.g., DIB II.20.44).
4. Political Philosophy
As the previous section stressed, Grotius' natural law theory wasabout much more than politics; it offered an account of normativity ofall kinds. At the same time as he was concerned to explicatenormativity generally speaking, the evidence unambiguously suggeststhat he was especially interested in political issues. After all, hedid lead a very political life and his two greatest works areeminently political. In this section, a few of his political ideas arediscussed.
Let's start with one closely connected to the problem of obligation.Just now, it was said that the ground of obligation lay in our naturesas rational, social, self-preserving beings. This is correct but itneeds amplification. Grotius did not conceive of our essences asstatic; instead, they are dynamic, expressive of our abilities andactivities. This is emphatically reflected in his conception of rights(ius, or iura in the plural). He distinguishesbetween several meanings of iura, the most important of whichconceives of a ius as “a moral quality of a person, making itpossible to have or to do something correctly” (DIB I.1.4).For Grotius, a ius or right is a capacity or power possessedby the agent; it is a “faculty” or an “aptitude” of the person(ibid.). To have a ius is to have the ability to engage incertain specified actions without moral or legal sanction. So, forexample, when he endows humans with the right to self-preservation, hegrants us the power to pursue our own interests without needing thepermission or assistance of the state or any other authority. Becauserights are centred on the individual subject, one will often read thatGrotius propounded a theory of “subjective right” (see, e.g.,Kingsbury and Roberts (1990), 31 and references there).
The import of Grotius' theory of rights can beclarified contrasting it with the dominant medieval conception ofiura. This conception stems primarily from Aquinas, who heldthat “the word ius was first of all used to denote the justthing itself” (ST II.ii.q57.art1). In its original usage,ius was applied to things—actions, entities,situations—and not persons. As Aquinas and his followersconceived of it, things earn the appellation “right” when they alignfully with the natural law. For two reasons, then, the medievalconception of rights can be thought of as “objective”: first, becausethe things which are right are objects (and not subjects);second, because things become worthy of the label “right” when theysatisfy an objective, agent-independent set of necessity andsufficient conditions, viz., those conditions required for conformityto the natural law. Now, it is true that this medieval view had begunto be displaced by Grotius' time; for example, Suarez says that a“strict acceptation of ius” bestows it “upon a certain moralpower which every man has, either over his own property or withrespect to that which is due to him” (De legibusI.2.5). However, Grotius is usually given the credit for shifting theparadigm fundamentally (see, e.g., Haakonssen (1985), 240; for an opposing view, see Irwin (2008), 98). While ittook time for his paradigm to become hegemonic, it did eventuallyprevail. When we say that so-and-so has the right tosuch-and-such, we usually mean that he has the means orpower to do such-and-such: for example, the assertion thatsomeone has the right to freedom of thought means that he has theability to think as he pleases and no one or no thing can force him todo otherwise. This was Grotius' view; though subsequently mediated bymany others, his contribution was essential.
In addition to its intrinsic interest, Grotius' innovative conceptionof rights had numerous important consequences. Two examples may serveas illustrations. First, whereas medieval theorists tended to speak of“the right,” Grotius and his successors stressed the powers andentitlements of the person who has rights. By associating rights withthe powers of a person, moderns were able to distinguish sharplybetween rights on the one hand versus duties on the other (cf. Finnis(1980), 209). Second, because Grotius made rights into powers orfaculties which humans possessed, he played a crucial part inthe commoditization of rights. Once rights became possessions, theycan be traded away just like all other possessions. The means oftransfer might not be identical to other exchanges of goods but theessential idea of giving away something in one's possession forsomething which isn't is there. As commentators have argued, thecommoditization of rights was one of the most important politicaldevelopments of the seventeenth century (for more, see especiallyMacpherson (1962), 3f).
Grotius exploited the latter idea in some of the more notorious partsof his corpus. Take the following:
At this point first of all the opinion of those must be rejected whohold that everywhere and without exception sovereignty resides in thepeople, so that it is permissible for the people to restrain and punishkings whenever they make a bad use of their power… We refute itby means of the following arguments.To every man it is permitted to enslave himself to any one hepleases for private ownership, as is evident both from the Hebraic andfrom the Roman Law. Why, then, would it there not be as lawful for aPeople who are at their own disposal to deliver up themselves to someone person, or to several persons, and transfer the right of governingthem upon him or them, retaining no vestige of that right forthemselves? (DIB I.3.8.1).
Grotius extends the case elsewhere, insisting that a people may givetheir rights to a ruler, receiving a peaceful and stable society inreturn (DIB I.4.2.1). But what are the limits placed on theruler who has taken possession of these rights? To some readers,Grotius' willingness to allow agents to transfer their rights leaveshim open to charges of befriending despots. Provided that the initialtransfer of rights was legitimate, then once the ruler is inpossession of rights, those living under him or her have no right tocomplain that certain forms of behaviour are unjust, for they have norelevant rights at all. As Rousseau put it, Grotius “spares no painsto rob the people of all their rights and invest kings with them”(Social Contract, Book II, Chapter Two). To be sure, otherreaders denied that Grotius' theory allowed agents a total transfer oftheir rights; in particular, they contended that agents will alwaysretain their fundamental rights, such as the right of self-defence(see Locke as interpreted by Tuck (1979), 172–3). Nevertheless,whatever the theory itself actually implies, it remains that Grotiushimself seems to have believed that agents may surrender all libertiesin certain circumstances (for more, see DIB I.3.9–16).
On a more positive note, Grotius' recognition of the transferabilityof rights led him to a novel solution for one of the great problems ofpolitical philosophy. What is the source of the state's right orpower? Two traditional answers were (1) God—he set up thestate and it derives its authority from his sanction—and (2)might—because the state is powerful, it has the authority togovern, for might makes right. While Grotius flirts with both ofthese, he finally settled for something else. He writes in theDIP, “just as every right [ius] of the magistratecomes to him from the state, so has the same right come to the statefrom private individuals; and similarly, the power of the state is theresult of collective agreement” (Chap. Eight). Through innumerable,separate, sequential decisions occurring over a protracted period oftime, individuals gradually agreed to form institutions for governingsociety by imbuing them with some of power which they naturallypossess. Eventually, these institutions gelled into a single coherententity which is the state. The state's power, then, is the productneither of God nor of sheer force but instead of the wilfultransference of individuals' powers or rights to it. It may be amistake to interpret this idea as a nascent contractualism (see Tuck(1993), 178–9) but likewise, it would be a mistake to deny the appealit would have to later contractualists such as Hobbes.
All of this underscores Grotius' real but uneven contributions to thedoctrines of political liberalism which were being formulated in histime. To the emerging theory of liberalism, he gave the idea thatindividuals—both individual persons and individual groups ofpersons—are bearers of rights. Also, he advanced thecompelling second-order account of the nature of those rightsdescribed above. And he argued strongly in support of the attributionof several specific first-order rights: for example, besides thosewhich have already been mentioned (such as self-defence), hevigorously defended rights to property. However, as important as theseand other contributions to liberalism are, they must be balancedagainst some of Grotius' other views. For instance, while it is truethat he thought individuals had rights, it is also true that hethought there were a number of circumstances in which those rightsmight be surrendered or even just overridden. So the rights that weare supposed to have in Grotius' theory are not completelyassured. More sinister are his views on slavery, which is or at leastcan be an entirely just institution. In the DIP he writesthat Aristotle is not “mistaken when he says that certain persons areby nature slaves” (Chap. Six, Quest. V, Art. One). While Grotius mayhave repudiated this thought in the DIB (see III.7.1—but see also I.3.8.4), a simple argument continued to convince himthat slavery is compatible with a just society. If individuals maysell their labour, Grotius reasons, then they should also be able tosell their liberty. If they sell all of their liberty, then they areof course slaves (I.3.8.1). A final weight to be placed on the balanceof Grotius' liberalism is his view on the status of rulers orsovereigns. Because sovereignty is “that power… whose actionsare not subject to the legal control of another” (DIBI.3.7.1), it follows as a necessary truth that those who holdsovereignty are necessarily superior to all others. Because they arenecessarily superior to the rest, Grotius considers rebarbative thesuggestion that sovereigns are answerable to their subjects. They maywish to take the needs of her or his subjects into account (III.15)but this is only “praiseworthy” and not imperative. In sum, then,Grotius' contributions to political liberalism are comparable toHobbes, Spinoza, Locke and other seventeenth century luminaries. Theyare genuine and significant while mixed with decidedly non-liberalthemes.
5. Just war doctrine
As the title of his magnum opus implies, the normative statusof war was of paramount concern to Grotius. The common distinctionbetween ius ad bellum and ius in bello—thedistinction between the rightful causes of war versus the rightfulconduct of war—is useful for understanding his views.Regarding ius ad bellum, Grotius devotes DIP Chap.Three and DIB I.2 to the question of whether it is everlawful to wage war. He argues that war is not only compatible with butsometimes compelled by all three major kinds of law—the law ofnature, the law of nations or international law, and divine law. Insupport of his answer, he adduces a number of conceptual, historicaland theological arguments. It would be tendentious to recount all ofhis arguments, so take just one influential example of the firstsort:
He who wills the attainment of a given end, wills also the thingsthat are necessary to that end. God wills that we should protectourselves, retain our hold on the necessities of life, obtain thatwhich is our due, punish transgressors, and at the same time defend thestate… But these divine objectives sometimes constitute causesfor undertaking and carrying on war… Thus it is God's Will thatcertain wars should be waged… Yet no one will deny thatwhatsoever God will, is just. Therefore, some wars are just.(DIP Chap. Three)
Far from believing that war is a condition outside the realm ofmorality and law, Grotius took it to be an instrument of right (cf.Dumbauld (1969), 73). As he wrote, “where judicial settlement fails,war begins” (DIB II.1.2.1). Wars may be justly undertaken inresponse either to “wrongs not yet committed, or to wrongs alreadydone” (ibid.). The list of wrongs which justify war is long, includingthe inflicting of punishment (ibid.), self-defence (II.1.3), thedefence of chastity (II.1.7), etc. At the same time as he countenanceswar, Grotius does set limits, some of them controversial. For example,he argues that one doesn't have the right to defend oneself against anassailant who is “useful to many” (II.1.9.1). This principle appliesto both individuals and states. So it follows that both individualsand states may be obliged to acquiesce when attacked by someoneimportant to society—whether the society of a single nation orthe society of nations. Overall, it has been argued, what setsGrotius' analysis of ius ad bellum apart from hispredecessors is “in his detailed and systematic elaboration of the‘just causes' of war’” (Draper (1992), 194).
Even supposing that a war has been undertaken rightly, it must also befought rightly for it to be just. And here we come to ius inbello, a topic treated in DIB Gucci mane album download. III. Grotius begins bysetting three rules governing the conduct of war (DIBIII.1.2–4), the first and most basic of which is that “In war thingswhich are necessary to attain the end in view are permissible”(III.1.2). This obviously places wide limits on permissible conduct,though it isn't as chilling as a first reading might suggest, for thenecessity requirement can be hard to meet. After advancing theserules, Grotius considers the permissibility of a large number ofactions. The variety and amount of detail in this discussion isfascinating. Typical is his analysis of ruses, deceit andfalsehood. Not only does he distinguish between those three ways ofconveying false impressions but also he distinguishes variationswithin each of them (see III.1.6–20). For example, if deceit is agenus, then deceit in a negative action is one species (III.1.7) anddeceit in a positive action is another (III.1.8). And deceit in apositive action can in turn be divided into two sub-species(ibid.). The practical aims of DIB come through plainly hereand throughout Book III, where the priority seems to be clarifyingwhat exactly is and is not permissible in war by considering a largenumber of actions which could belligerents could undertake anddetermining their moral and legal standing. In general, Grotius heldthat war is justifiable when, and only when, it serves right. Sincethe conditions for service to right are numerous and non-obvious, hemust expend considerable effort identifying and explicating them (formore, see Draper (1992), 191–207).
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6. Originality and Influence
Coming at last to a broader assessment of Grotius' contributions to the history of ideas, we should start by distinguishing the question of his originality from that of his influence. For our purposes, it will suffice to define originality as involving the formation of novel and important new concepts and/or methods while taking influence to consist in having major effects on others. Let us handle originality first before coming to the easier question of Grotius' influence.
Given that his work ranged across so many different fields—ethics, political theory, politics, religion—it is impossible to make a blanket statement that Grotius was or was not an original thinker. Instead, the only responsible approach is to deal with his alleged contributions on a case-by-case basis. Because it would be tedious to go through all the cases here, let us just take the two which are likely to be of greatest interest to philosophers: ethics and political theory.
There is scholarly dispute about the originality of Grotius' ethics.Irwin (2008) has recently argued that because he merely extracts themajor elements of his theory of morality from other authors,especially Aquinas and Suarez, “Grotius is no pioneer” in the historyof ethics (98). By contrast, Schneewind (1993) thinks that Grotiusdeserves credit for introducing agonism into ethics—the notionthat “conflict is ineradicable, and could not be removed, even inprinciple, by the completest possible metaphysical knowledge of howthe world is constituted” (58). Others who have weighed in includeKilcullen (1995) and Darwall (forthcoming). A clear and balancedassessment is given by Tierney (1997), Chapter XIII.
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Turning to political theory, Sections 4–5 above identifiedvarious concrete contributions of Grotius' to politics. For manyscholars, however, Grotius is important not so much for his new ideasas for his new way of thinking about political problems. So,Kingsbury and Roberts (1990) say, “the greatest direct contributionof” the DIB is “the systematic reassembling of practice andauthorities on the traditional but fundamental subject of the jusbelli, organized for the first time around a body of principlesrooted in the law of nature” (3–4).
There is a different gauge of Grotius' originality in the domain ofpolitics. Through his writings, he gave rise to a theory of statehoodand the relations among states which has come to be known as, simply,“Grotian” (the labels are used by Wight (1991), among others). Thistheory is an account of the origins and identity conditions of states.It conceives of states as existing not in a pre- or anti-socialcondition but rather in an international society governed by a systemof norms. Those norms hold apart from a positive action by alegislature or legislator. At the same time as it insists on theexistence and relevance of these norms (which are, of course, the lawsof nature), it is also cognizant of the force of realpolitick. Individual states will engage in the pursuit of their ownperceived interests, regardless of whether such pursuits place them inconflict with the natural law. By doing all of this, the Grotianschool is supposed to negotiate a middle way between bare-knuckled“Machiavellianism” and excessively idealistic “Kantianism” (for more,see Wight together with the criticisms in Bull (1976)). Depending onthe fortunes of these schools at any particular moment in history,Grotius' influence on international relations will be waxing orwaning.
That mention of the influence brings us to the second broad topic of this concluding section. Scholars may argue about whether and how Grotius was original but no one can doubt his influence. For example, the Swedish King Gustav Adolph is supposed to have kept a copy of the DIB under his pillow, next to the Bible. And King James I reacted strongly (and negatively) to Grotius' presentations during a diplomatic mission to England.
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So Grotius' influence was felt on some of the major actors of his day. Naturally, though, his main impact was on other scholars. Bayle called him “one of the greatest men in Europe.” Leibniz hailed “the incomparable Hugo Grotius.” Thomas Reid spoke of “the immortal Hugo Grotius,” Hutcheson drew on him extensively, and Hume approvingly cited an argument of his about the origins of property in the third appendix of his second Enquiry. To be sure, not all were so impressed. Rousseau's opinion has already been cited; the natural law theorist Samuel Pufendorf was also sceptical. And Voltaire found Grotius to be simply boring. Still, whether for good or for ill, Grotius was at the centre of letters for an enviably long time. For a brief synopsis of Grotius' influence, focusing on the DIB , see Tuck (2005), pp. ix-xii.
Bibliography
Primary Texts and Translations
Power soundtrack season 2 download torrent. N.B.: This is but a small selection of Grotius' more importantworks. For a more complete catalogue, see ter Meulen and Diermanse(1950).
- Mare liberum (Leiden: Elzevier, 1609). Reprinted andtranslated many times since. The translation and edition by Ralph vanDeman Magoffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1916) contains afacsimile of the 1633 edition. See also the recently published TheFree Sea; trans. by Richard Hakluyt with William Welwod'scritique and Grotius's reply, edited and with anintroduction by David Armitage (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,2004).
- De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (Paris: Buon, 1625).Reprinted and translated many times since. Jean Barbeyrac's 1735edition, with extensive notes and commentary, was the most important;it was translated into English and published in London byInnys et al. in 1738. It has been recently reprinted as The Rights of War and Peace, Books I-III, edited and with an introduction by Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005). Another commonly used edition and translation is by Frank W. Kelsey et al. for the Classics of International Law series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925). Kelsey's version is printed with a facsimile of the 1646 edition.
- Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis (Amsterdam: Blaeu,1657). Translated by T. Manley (London: Twyford and Paulet,1665).
- Opera omnia theologica (London: Moses Pitt, 1679).
- De iure praedae commentarius, ed. by G. Hamaker (TheHague: Nijhoff, 1868). The most commonly used edition and translationis by G.L. Williams et al. for the Classics of International Lawseries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950). Williams' version isprinted along with a collotype of Grotius' manuscript.
- Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius, ed. by P.C. Molhuysen etal. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1928–2001).
- Grotius Reader: A Reader for Students of International Law andLegal History, ed. by L.E. van Holk and C.G. Roelofsen (TheHague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1983).
- The Antiquity of the Batavian Republic (Assen, theNetherlands: Royal van Gorcum, 2000). Ed. and trans. by Jan Waszink etal.
Select Secondary Literature
N.B.: In addition to the following (which emphasizes English-languageliterature), interested readers should also consult the scholarlyjournal Grotiana (new series), which regularly publishesarticles in several languages on all aspects of Grotius' thought andlegacy.
Storia della letteratura inglese, a cura di Paolo Bertinetti, Torino, Einaudi, 2000. Breve storia della letteratura inglese bertinetti pdf. Storia della letteratura inglese, vol. Lavezzi, Breve dizionario di retorica e. Breve storia della letteratura inglese Item Preview. https://caestagumvi.tistory.com/7.
Anthologies:
- [anonymous]. (1984). (ed.) The World of Hugo Grotius(Amsterdam and Maarssen: APA—Holland University Press).
- Asser Instituut. (1985). (eds.) International Law and theGrotian Heritage (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut).
- Blom, Hans W. (2009). (ed.) Property, Piracy and Punishment: Hugo Grotius on War and Booty in De Iure Praedae—Concepts and Contexts (Leiden: Brill).
- Blom, Hans W., and Winkel, Laurens. (2004). (eds.) Grotius andthe Stoa (Assen, the Netherlands: Royal Van Gorcum).
- Bull, Hedley, et al. (1990). (eds.) Hugo Grotius andInternational Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Dunn, John, and Harris, Ian. (1997). (eds.) Grotius,vols. 1–2 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing). (N.B.: Thislarge collection reprints a number of the articles cited individuallybelow.)
- Onuma, Yasuaki. (1993). (ed.) A Normative Approach to War(Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Bibliographies:
- Eyffinger, A.C., et al. (1983). The Grotius Collection at thePeace Palace: A Concise Catalogue (The Hague: Peace PalaceLibrary).
- Molhuysen, Philippus Christianus. (1943). “De Bibliotheek van Hugode Groot in 1618,” Mededeelingen der Nederlandsche Akademie vanWetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe reeks, dl.6, no. 3. (N.B.: This is a list of books in Grotius' possession in1618.)
- ter Meulen, Jacob, and Diermanse, P.J.J. (1950). Bibliographiedes écrits imprimés de Hugo Grotius (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff).
- ––– (1961). Bibliographie des écritssur Hugo Grotius imprimés au XVIIe sicle (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff).
- Willems, J.C.M. (1980, 1981, ongoing). Grotiana (newseries), vols. 1, 2, etc.
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Biographies:
- Bayle, Pierre. (1720). “Grotius,” in Dictionaire historique etcritique, 3rd ed. (Rotterdam: Michel Bohm).
- Brandt, Caspar, and Cattenburgh, Adriaan van. (1732). Historievan het leven des heeren Huig de Groot, 2nd ed.(Dordrecht and Amsterdam: Van Braam en onder der Linden).
- Dumbauld, Edward. (1969). The Life and Legal Writings of HugoGrotius (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press).
- Edwards, Charles. (1981). Hugo Grotius (Chicago:Nelson-Hall).
- Holk, L.E. van. (1983). “Hugo Grotius, 1583–1645, A BiographicalSketch,” in van Holk and Roelofsen (1983): 23–44.
- Knight, W.S.M. (1925). The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius(London: Sweet and Maxwell Publishers).
- Vreeland, Hamilton, Jr. (1917). Hugo Grotius: the Father ofthe Modern Science of International Law (New York: OxfordUniversity Press).
Monographs and articles:
- Blom, Hans. (1995). Causality and Morality: the rise ofnaturalism in Dutch seventeenth-century political thought, Ph.D.thesis, Utrecht University.
- Brandt, Reinhard. (1974). Eigentumstheorien von Grotius bisKant (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog).
- Brett, Annabel. (2002). “Natural Right and Civil Community: TheCivil Philosophy of Hugo Grotius,” The Historical Journal,vol. 45: 31–51.
- Bull, Hedley. (1976). “Martin Wight and the Theory ofInternational Relations,” British Journal of InternationalStudies, vol. 2: 101–116.
- Chroust, Anton-Hermann. (1943). “Hugo Grotius and the ScholasticNatural Law Tradition,” New Scholasticism, vol. 17:101–133. Reprinted in Dunn and Harris (1997).
- Darwall, Stephen. (forthcoming). “Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (forthcoming).
- Draper, G.I.A.D. (1990). “Grotius' Place in the Development ofLegal Ideas about War,” in Bull et al. (1990): 177–207.
- Dufour, Alfred. (1980). “L'influence de la méthodologie dessciences physiques et mathématiques sur les fondateurs del'école du droit naturel moderne (Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf),”Grotiana (New Series), vol. 1: 33–52. Reprinted in Dunnand Harris (1997).
- ––– (1984). “Grotius et le droit naturel du dix-septime sicle,”in [Anonymous] (1984): 15–41.
- Finnis, John. (1980). Natural Law and Natural Rights(Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Gurvitch, G. (1927). “La philosophie du droit de Hugo Grotius etla théorie moderne du droit international,” Revue deMetaphysique et de Morale, vol. 34: 365–391.
- Haakonssen, Knud. (1985). “Hugo Grotius and the History ofPolitical Thought,” Political Theory, vol. 13:239–265. Reprinted in Dunn and Harris (1997).
- ––– (1992). “Natural Law,” in Lawrence C. Becker and CharlotteB. Becker, eds., The Encylopedia of Ethics (New York:Garland Publishers): 884–890.
- ––– (1996). Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotiusto the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress).
- ––– (1998). “Divine/natural law theories in ethics,” in DanielGarber and Michael Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History ofSeventeenth-Century Philosophy, vols. 1–2 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press): 1317–1357.
- Haggenmacher, Peter. (1983). Grotius et la doctrine de laguerre juste (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France). (N.B.:This monograph also has an extensive bibliography; see pp.645–672.)
- Hart, A. C. 't. (1983). “Hugo Grotius and GiambattistaVico,” Netherlands International Law Review,vol. 30: 5–41. Reprinted in Dunn and Harris (1997).
- Hodges, Donald Clark. (1956/7). “Grotius on the law of war,”Modern Schoolman, vol. 34: 36–44.
- Hofmann, Hasso. (1977). “Hugo Grotius,” in Michael Stolleis, ed.,Staatsdenker im 17 und 18 Jahrhundert: Reichspublizistik, Politik,Naturrecht (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner): 51–77.
- Irwin, Terence. (2008). The Development of Ethics, vol. II (Oxford:Oxford University Press).
- Kilcullen, John. (2001). “The Origin of Property: Ockham, Grotius, Pufendorf and Some Others,” in Kilcullen and Scott (2001), pp. 883–932.
- Kilcullen, John, and Scott, John. (2001). (trans.) William of Ockham, Work of Ninety, (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press).
- Kingsbury, Benedict, and Roberts, Adam. (1990). “Introduction:Grotian Thought in International Relations,” in Bull et al.(1990): 1–64.
- Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996). The Sources ofNormativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Lauterpacht, Hersch. (1946). “The Grotian Tradition inInternational Law,” The British Yearbook of InternationalLaw, vol. XXIII: 1–53. Reprinted in Dunn and Harris(1997).
- Macpherson, C.B. (1962). The Political Theory of PossessiveIndividualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Miller, Jon. (2003). “Stoics, Grotius and Spinoza on moraldeliberation,” in Jon Miller and Brad Inwood, eds., Hellenisticand Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress): 116–140.
- Remec, Peter Paul. (1960). The Position of the Individual inInternational Law according to Grotius and Vattel (The Hague:Nijhoff).
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1915). Political Writings, vols.I–II, ed. and trans. by C. E. Vaughan (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press).
- St. Leger, James. (1962). The “Etiamsi Daremus” of HugoGrotius: A Study in the Origins of International Law (Rome:Pontificium Athenaeum Internationale).
- Schneewind, J.B. (1993). “Kant and natural law ethics,”Ethics, vol. 104: 53–74.
- ––– (1998). The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Shaver, Robert. (1996). “Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest,”Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 78:27–47.
- Simmonds, Kenneth R. (1957). “Some English Precursors of HugoGrotius,” Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 43:143–157.
- ––– (1957/8). “Hugo Grotius and Alberico Gentili,” Jahrbuchfür Internationales Recht, Band 8: 85–100.
- Straumann, Benjamin. (2006). “'Ancient Caesarian Lawyers' in a State of Nature: Roman Tradition and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius's De iure praedae,” Political Theory, vol. 34: 328–350.
- ––– (2007). Hugo Grotius und die Antike (Baden-Baden: NOMOS).
- Tanaka, Tadashi. (1993). “Grotius' method: with special reference toProlegomena,” in Onuma (1993): 11–31.
- Tierney, Brian. (1983). “Tuck on rights: some medieval problems,”History of Political Thought, vol. 6: 429–441.
- ––– (1997). The Idea of Natural Rights (Atlanta: Scholars Press).
- Todescan, Franco (2003). Etiamsi Daremus: Studi Sinfonici sul Diritto Naturale (Padua: CEDAM).
- Tuck, Richard. (1979). Natural Rights Theories(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- ––– (1983). “Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes,” Grotiana(new series), vol. 4: 43–62. Reprinted in Dunn and Harris(1997).
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Other Internet Resources
- Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius (in Dutch). A very useful website on Grotius' correspondence—including a searchable index of all the names in it, maintained at theInstituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis.
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